The rate of technological growth is likely to be affected by the way in which the stock of human resources is allocated. This social sorting of individuals over occupations is (partly) a market outcome, affected by the relative return to intellectual ability such as intelligence and other individual merits. To analyze how the social sorting is affected by growth, we present a stylized endogenous growth model where each agent can choose to be a worker or an entrepreneur. The reward for entrepreneurs is an endogenous function of the abilities they have been endowed with by nature and the amount of knowledge and other social assets they inherit from their parents. When growth is low, the equilibrium in the labor market implies that the reward for entrepreneurs depends more on social assets than on intelligence. This gives children of entrepreneurs a large ex-ante advantage over children of workers when working as entrepreneurs, and will cause low intergenerational social mobility and an allocation of human resources that hampers technological growth. On the other hand, there is also a stable equilibrium with high growth which creates an allocation of intellectual ability which, in turn, fosters high growth and implies high intergenerational social mobility. * 
Intelligence, Social Mobility and Growth

Introduction
Individuals are not born equal. Society endows different individuals with different abilities.
An individual's upbringing is determined by her social background and affects her future ability to respond adequately to the problems faced by economic agents. Other differences between individuals are due to nature -some individuals are more talented, for example, learn more easily or are more intelligent, than others. Using economic jargon, we may say that an individual is born with two types of valuable assets -innate and social ones.
Holding other things constant, innate and social assets both increase the expected lifetime earnings of an individual.
The distribution of innate and social assets among individuals is not independent between generations. In the game of allocating intellectual ability, mother nature stacks the cards in favor of individuals with gifted parents. We may call this the genetic heritage.
Similarly, the upbringing of one's offspring provides a powerful mechanism for transferring social advantages between generations. This is the social heritage.
In this paper, we will assume that genetic heritage is weaker than social heritage. In other words, an individual's amount of innate assets depends less on her parents, and more on chance, than does her amount of social assets. More specifically, we assume innate intellectual ability (intelligence) to be less than perfectly correlated between generations, while the social advantages that come with a particular upbringing are fully determined by the social position of the parents. Social mobility will then depend on whether the social sorting mechanism emphasizes traits and abilities determined by innate or social assets. If innate intellectual ability is important for an individual's social position, social mobility will be high. If the individual's upbringing, determined by her parents, is more important, social mobility will instead be low.
Our first goal is to demonstrate that economic mechanisms determine the relative importance of innate abilities and social heritage when individuals are allocated over different economic roles in society. We will show that this mechanism is affected by the growth rate of the economy. For this purpose, we construct a stylized economy where each individual chooses whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker. Workers will be paid a common wage, determined on a Walrasian labor market. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, will be rewarded on basis of their ability to take the correct action in difficult situations. There are no barriers to this choice -individuals are free to choose the option that gives maximum expected lifetime utility.
An entrepreneur's ability to determine which is the best action increases both with her amount of social and innate assets. The relative importance of these two types of assets will, however, depend on growth. Low growth means that the world changes slowly -that the right actions yesterday are also likely to be the right ones today. We assume that parents who were entrepreneurs themselves, have learned the optimal behavior of an entrepreneur and can transfer this information to their children, which they will find useful, provided that the world has not changed much since their parents were entrepreneurs. When working in entrepreneurial positions, children of entrepreneurs will then have a large ex-ante advantage over children of workers.
If, instead, the rate of growth is high, we expect the economic environment to change rapidly. The information regarding how to be a successful entrepreneur acquired by parents working as entrepreneurs then depreciates quickly. Consequently, the children of entrepreneurs will not enjoy as great an advantage over children of workers as in the low growth case. On the other hand, "the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations", becomes more important. The quote is a standard definition of intelligence 1 . When growth is high, the world changes more between generations, and the environment is "new and trying" for everybody. Thus, intelligence is a more important determinant of individual success in this case.
Our second goal is to show that the previous mechanism does not only imply that social mobility and growth are positively related, but may also help us understand why two societies starting with the same amount of factors of production may show radically different economic outcomes and social structures.
Our model is an endogenous growth model and such models generally require an accumable factor of production with non-diminishing returns. One such factor is aggregate knowledge, since ideas created by intelligent people in new situations can be used by other 1 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate, Tenth Edition, from Encyclopedia Britannica On-Line Edition people and adapted to other situations. But, the likelihood of an intelligent individual creating an idea depends on her position in society. Thus, the process of social sorting becomes crucial in order to determine the growth rate. A society allocating intelligent and innovative individuals to positions where they produce large externalities should have larger growth rates than one placing average individuals in these positions. This is the main point in Murphy et al. [16] . They also show empirical evidence for the hypothesis that talented individuals are more important for growth if they are engineers rather than lawyers. Similarly, Baumol [1] uses historical evidence to support the idea that growth increases if society directs more entrepreneurial talent to productive rather than to rent-seeking activities.
We thus believe the understanding of the mechanisms behind the social sorting of individuals with different levels of intelligence to be of key importance to economists. Our contribution is to provide a formal model which endogenizes the way in which a society allocates its intelligence resources. The model is built around a walrasian labor market allocating individuals on basis of their levels of productivity in different occupations, not accounting for the externalities they might produce. Thus, intelligent agents may end up working in positions where their abilities to foster growth is not fully exploited. Indeed, this will be the case in a low growth economy. On the other hand, our model shows that if the rate of growth is high, the walrasian labor market will turn into a more efficient social sorting mechanism, due to that high growth increases the return to intelligence for entrepreneurs, while a good social background more than makes up for a not so bright mind under low growth. Growth improves the social sorting mechanism provided by the market and diminishes the adverse effects of the externality.
The purpose of this paper should now be clear. Consider two ex-ante identical societies, Richland and Poorland. They have access to the same resources (both human and physical), but for historical reasons, they have different social structures. The entrepreneurial class of Poorland mainly consists of the children of previous entrepreneurs. From an intellectual point of view, they are a random sample of society's entire population, and consequently, have average amounts of innate assets. Thus, they are not very innovative, and do not substantially change the world. Nevertheless, they confront economic challenges, and learn from these. They can explain to their children what actions were the best to take during their working life. This is sufficient to give the children of the entrepreneurs the upper hand -they will become the entrepreneurs of the next generation. Consequently, the intelligence of the entrepreneurial class of Poorland will remain on an average level. Poorlandians will have little or no growth for generations to come.
In Richland, the situation is different; the entrepreneurs are the most intelligent individuals in society and they innovate and generate growth. They thus make the world change rapidly, and the information that they can pass on to their children thus depreciates so quickly that it is of no or little value. The next generation of entrepreneurs will thus be formed by the intellectually gifted and the people of Richland will enjoy consistent high growth.
Most of the literature dealing with growth, social mobility and income distribution has focused on the effects of financial market imperfections on human capital accumulation (Galor and Zeira [10] and Benabou [2] , for instance). The central issue in our paper -how growth affects the sorting efficiency of the labor market -has not been considered in this line of literature. Galor and Tsiddon [12] is the paper closest to ours. By defining two different types of technological change, major technological breakthroughs ("inventions") and gradual technological progress ("innovation"), they model the effects of technological change on intergenerational mobility. Intergenerational social mobility increases and social sorting becomes more efficient after an invention, which produces a "burst" of economic growth, followed by more innovation and a return to lower growth and less efficient social sorting. This produces cycles in growth and mobility.
In contrast to Galor and Tsiddon [12] , we focus on long-run growth. More importantly, we construct a model which allows us to endogenize the relative returns to the two types of human capital as equilibrium outcomes on the labor market. Galor and Tsiddon instead [12] assume that rapid technological progress increases the relative return to (intellectual) ability and diminishes the relative return to family background. They also provide empirical support for this assumption (Juhn et al., [7] ). The main contribution of this paper is to provide an explicit theoretical model for how this empirical relation between technological growth and the relative return to intellectual ability may result as a market outcome.
Rather than competing with Galor and Tsiddon [12] , we believe our paper to provide an important building stone to their story.
Empirical evidence of the relationship between growth and social mobility is scarce, but seems consistent with our results. Eriksson and Goldthorpe [14] provide empirical findings consistent with the conventional wisdom that there is a jump in intergenerational social mobility at some point in the development of economies. They also construct an index of intergenerational social mobility for nine countries. The average intergenerational mobility in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. is lower than in Sweden, Japan, the U.S. and Australia. The average long-run growth rate also seems to have been lower in the former group. The average growth rate per year between 1870 and 1979 was 1.77% in the former group versus 2.43 in the latter. If the somewhat exceptional case of Australia is removed from the latter group, the difference becomes greater. 2 There is a growing body of literature which shows that per capita incomes in different countries do not seem to converge, but to diverge towards a bimodal distribution. 3 Since our baseline model represents a single economy, some extensions are necessary for it to be consistent with this finding. In a nutshell, make two additional assumptions; the best technology in use in Richland "trickles down" to Poorland with a time lag, and at that lagged date, it can be used without much need for intelligence. These assumptions will have the single effect of making the steady state growth rate of Poorland coincide with that of Richland, but their income levels will be different.
Our paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 describes the basic model with exogenous growth, which allows us to analyze the social sorting mechanism as a function of growth. Section 3 endogenizes growth by introducing a link between the allocation of innate assets, generated by the social sorting mechanism, and growth. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
A Model of Human Resource Allocation
Entrepreneurs and Workers
In each discrete time period, there is a continuum of mass 1 of individuals, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each individual lives one period only, and the common utility function is logarithmic. 4 Each individual chooses whether to be a worker or an entrepreneur. If she chooses to be a worker, she gets the known market wage at time t, denoted w t . If she chooses to be an entrepreneur, she creates a firm and is the residual claimant to firm profits.
An entrepreneur must make two decisions. First, she must choose the number of workers to hire. Second, she must take an entrepreneurial decision a ∈ R. The task of the entrepreneur is to set a as close to an unobservable stochastic variable x t as possible. The larger the distance between a and x t , the lower are the profits in t. More specifically, the profits of the firm are: 5
We can think of x t as the "best way" of running a firm. In other words, x t represents the optimal location of an entrepreneur in the space of possible technologies, firm organizations, geographic locations and so on. Obviously, x t is a multi-dimensional object in the real world.
To simplify, we assume that it is uni-dimensional, however.
Profits are clearly maximized ex-post if a = x t . However, no individual knows the value of x t ex-ante. Furthermore, individuals differ in their beliefs about x t , although we assume that all agents have rational expectations. Below, we will describe how these expectations are formed. Now take the expectation of the distribution of x t as given and consider an individual i who believes that x t is normally distributed, with mean µ(i) and variance 1 P (i) . P (i) is thus the precision of i's beliefs. In other words, It is straightforward to show that all entrepreneurs will hire l t = ( At wt ) 2 workers, regardless of their beliefs. The best action does, of course, depend on beliefs and will be a = µ(i).
An entrepreneur's utility will be stochastic with an expected value given by
which, of course, increases in the precision P (i).
If the individual instead chooses to be a worker, her utility will be certain and equal to log(w t ), independent of her beliefs about, and the realization of, x t .
If w t ≥ A t , it is obvious that nobody will choose to be an entrepreneur. For lower wages, an individual with precision P (i) chooses to be an entrepreneur if
Thus, z t is the threshold precision such that an individual is indifferent between being an entrepreneur and a worker. This threshold is a monotonously increasing function of the wage. When deriving the equilibrium conditions of the model below, we use z t rather than the wage, which simplifies the notation considerably. Note also that the labor demand can be written
which is decreasing in z t and thus in the wage.
If (3) holds with equality, the agent is clearly indifferent between being an entrepreneur and being a worker. If her precision is smaller than z t , she chooses to be a worker.
Information and Intelligence
Now assume that x t follows the stochastic process
where t is white noise with a variance equal to σ and 0 < ρ < 1. σ can be considered as an index of the flow rate of new ideas and technological innovations. If σ is high, the flow is high, and the "best way" of running a firm thus changes quickly. A high level of σ thus implies that the intrinsic difficulty of being an entrepreneur is high. Similarly, ρ measures at what rate the "best way" is decaying. Holding σ constant, a higher value of ρ increases the informational value in period t of knowing the "best way" in t − 1, since that piece of information says more about how to be a successful entrepreneur than it does if ρ is low.
At present, we let σ be exogenous, and later, we will make it endogenous.
The expected profits of an entrepreneur depend on the precision in her information about x t . We assume that each entrepreneur observes the value of x t after she has decided a. She will thus learn ex-post which action would have been the best. This is of no importance to her, but it can be important to her descendants. We assume that the children of entrepreneurs (CoE for short) know the realization of x t−1 . On the other hand, the children of workers (CoW for short) only know the unconditional distribution of x t , determined by (5) . 6 The extra knowledge given to CoE is what we called "social assets"
in the introduction. 7 The fact that there is no market for knowledge about the "best way"
of running a firm in the previous period is, of course, crucial for our results. We consider these social assets as embodied human capital rather than as a tradable piece of information.
We thus implicitly assume that such knowledge can only be transferred through the (slow) process of upbringing in the parental household. 8 We also assume that individuals differ in terms of their level of innate intellectual ability.
In this paper we focus on the the ability to learn, understand or deal with new or trying situations. Since this corresponds to the dictionary definition of intelligence, we will use this term and assume that individuals vary with respect to their level of intelligence.
More specifically, by the term "intelligence", we mean any trait or characteristic with the following properties:
1. It helps solving a problem that the individual has not faced before, and 2. is distributed independently of the actions taken by the individual or her parents, in 6 We could make their knowledge conditional on the x observed by the last of her ancestors to be an entrepreneur, but this would certainly complicate the analysis without adding any qualitative change.
7 A different, but clearly related, social heritage is modeled in Sjögren [6] , where it is assumed that an individual knows her ability in the trade of her parents but is unsure of her ability in other occupations. This is also the way in which Galor and Tsiddon [12] model social heritage. 8 In this extremely stylized model, "social assets" are simply the knowledge of a particular number xt, i.e., something that could in theory be bought and sold. In reality, it is inconceivable that the knowledge and the experience acquired by growing up in "the right" family could be bought and sold at a perfect market. In our view, this is not because this kind of knowledge cannot be represented by numbers associated with particular stochastic variables. Rather it is because human limitations imply that this knowledge is so complex (multidimensional) that it can only be transferred if the individual grows up in the right circumstances. It is only for simplicity that we represent this by a univariate variable. particular, of the occupational choice of the parents, and 3. is less than perfectly correlated between generations.
We are not neuro-scientists, and this paper is not about psychology or neuro-science, 9 so we do want to imply that we know what intelligence is, or, for example, how genetics affect it. The only thing we need to assume is that a characteristic with the properties given above exists in the population with a non-degenerate distribution. 10 Given the above properties, differences in intelligence could be modeled in two ways.
We might assume that intelligent individuals process whatever information they might have better than less gifted individuals (for example, by adding a random error to the less intelligent individual's decision). We have, however, followed a second strategy. We assume a perfect processing ability, but in order to generate differences in expected pay-offs, we assume the level of intelligence to be determined by the precision in an unbiased private signal about the world. 11 Each individual rationally combines her private information with information received from other sources. Rational Bayesian updating with normally distributed signals implies that posterior beliefs are normally distributed with a precision equal to the sum of the precisions of the prior and the signal. Thus, given identical parents, the person with the most informative private information set (i.e., the most intelligent person) will always have the highest expected pay-off. The private information set is not transferable between individuals, it is invariant over time and cannot be affected by the individual (for example through training or education). We should note that intelligence is of no importance in a situation with full common information. The more difficult a situation, the more important is intelligence, which seems well in line with the dictionary definition of intelligence quoted above.
We now proceed by making the simplification that there are only two levels of intelligence. Individuals have a high or a low level of intelligence. 12 13 An individual with a high level of intelligence, receives an unbiased signal on x t that is distributed as a normal with variance α < 1). 14 Individuals with a low level of intelligence also get an unbiased signal on x t , but with a variance equal to one. We also assume the level of intelligence to be uncorrelated between parents and children. 15 q intelligent agents are born in each period.
TYPE Number at t Precision
CoE,High 
The intuition is straightforward. For low values of σ ρ , the information given by entrepreneurs to their children is quite accurate in the sense that little has changed between the two periods. In a stagnant world, it is thus a great advantage to have parents in entrepreneurial positions. Under such circumstances, a CoE,Low will be able to make good decisions. If σ ρ is large, on the other hand, the information entrepreneurs transfer to their children is not of much use and thus, intelligence is a more important determinant of the expected entrepreneurial success.
Equilibrium conditions
The model has two equilibrium conditions. First, given individual career choices, the labor market must clear. Second, given the wage established in the labor market, each individual chooses the the career which maximizes her expected utility.
Consider first the labor market equilibrium. This is a price of labor, which we express in terms of z t , and an amount of entrepreneurs, m t , such that labor supply equals labor demand. For a given number of entrepreneurs at t, labor supply is completely inelastic and equal to (1 − m t ). Labor demand is a function of z t , since each entrepreneur will hire e 1 z t workers. In equilibrium, the number of workers demanded must equal the fixed supply of labor, i.e.,
This establishes a (positive) relationship between z t (the wage) and the number of entrepreneurs.
The second equilibrium condition is that m t equals the number of agents with a precision higher than or equal to z t , so that all agents choose the job which maximizes their individual expected utility. This condition also establishes a relation between m t and z t , which we will denote m t = M (z t ). At very low wage levels, everybody prefers to be entrepreneurs.
Increasing the wage implies that an increasing number of groups will come to prefer being workers. The CoW,Low are always the first to do this and the CoE,High are the last.
Which of the intermediate groups comes first is determined by whether (6) 
Clearly, (7) and (8) together are necessary and sufficient for equilibrium. The relations between m t and z t given by SD and M are depicted in figure 1 . The function SD(z t ) monotonically increases from zero and converges asymptotically to 16 Clearly the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs cannot be higher than 1 2 , because each entrepreneur in steps, from one to zero. This insures the existence of an (unique) equilibrium (m t and w t ) at t for any possible m t−1 , σ and ρ. Note also that M (z t ) depends on m t−1 , since the height of some of the steps depends on the number of CoE, which is determined by m t−1 .
It is now convenient to make two definitions:
Definition 1 Let m w (σ) denote the number of entrepreneurs such that the equilibrium labor market wage makes the CoW,High indifferent between career choices:
Let m e (σ) denote the number of entrepreneurs such that the equilibrium labor market wage makes the CoE,Low indifferent between career choices:
The two cases discussed above, i.e., whether CoW,High or CoE,Low are better entrepreneurs, can now be expressed in terms of m. If m w (σ) > m e (σ), then social assets are more important than intelligence, in the sense that a CoE,Low is better suited to be an entrepreneur than a CoW,High. Since CoE,Low make better entrepreneurs than CoW,High, they can accept a larger number of entrepreneurs than CoW,High, before the resulting equilibrium labor market wage becomes so high that they prefer to be workers. If
, the opposite is true. It is straightforward to see that
Steady State
Let us now focus on the steady state in the model. In a steady state equilibrium, we require the number of entrepreneurs to be constant: m t−1 = m t = m. Consider first the case when social assets are more important than intelligence. This happens when σ < ρ in this range and they thus tolerate a larger number of entrepreneurs before the resulting equilibrium wage makes them prefer to become workers. The two equilibrium relations m t = SD(z t ) and m t = M (z t ) for this case are depicted in figure 1 . We see that one segment of M (z t ) (marked with a thicker line) equals m t−1 . In a steady state equilibrium, SD(z t ) must thus cross M (z t ) at that segment. If SD(z t ) crosses M (z t ) at any other segment, the resulting equilibrium value of m t differs from m t−1 . For any value of m t−1 such that SD(z t ) crosses M (z t ) at the segment where it equals m t , but for these values of m t−1 only, the resulting equilibrium is a steady state. At all these equilibria, the equilibrium wage is lower than P CoE,Low , so that all CoE are entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, the equilibrium wage is higher than P CoW,High , so that all CoW are workers.
Mobility is nil and we have a society which is stratified in self-reproducing castes. Expressed formally, we have: Consider the dynamical stability of steady states with no social mobility. First, we note that for any m t−1 ∈ (m w , m e ), a small deviation in m t simply moves the steady state to the new value of m. Then, consider an m t−1 > m e , which is thus outside the steady state region. This situation is depicted in figure 2 , where we see that the equilibrium value of m t is now m e , unless qm t−1 > m e . The value m t = m e is a steady state. Similarly, but not depicted; if m t−1 < m w , but q + (1 − q)m t−1 > m w , the equilibrium value of m t is m w , which is a steady state. 17 The conclusion is thus: 17 For larger deviations from the steady state, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs clearly moves towards the steady state region, but a steady state may not be achieved in one period only.
Let us now turn to the case when σ > ρ α 1−α . In this case, the CoW,High are better entrepreneurs than the CoE,Low, so m w > m e . This situation is depicted in figure 3 .
In a steady state, the wage can clearly not exceed the wage which makes the CoW,High indifferent between being entrepreneurs and workers. Otherwise, only the CoE,High would be entrepreneurs in the next period, i.e., m t = m t−1 q < m t−1 . Furthermore, the wage in a steady state cannot be lower than the wage that makes the CoE,Low indifferent.
Otherwise
We now have three cases, which one depends on the value of the parameter q, i.e., the share of intelligent individuals in the whole economy. The first case arises if the total share of intelligent individuals is lower than m w and higher than m e . This case is depicted in figure 3 , where we see that the steady state equilibrium is at the point where SD(z t ) crosses M (z t ) at the horizontal thick segment where q = M (z t ). This is clearly the unique steady state equilibrium in this case. All individuals with a high level of intelligence but no other are entrepreneurs, i.e., m = q and z = SD −1 (q). The second case arises if the parameters are such that q > m w . In this case, SD(z t ) crosses M (z t ) at the vertical segment above P CoW,High , as depicted in figure 4 . This equilibrium replicates itself and is the unique steady state. In this case, the share of intelligent people is so large that not all of them can become entrepreneurs in equilibrium. The wage is thus P CoW,High , which makes CoW,High indifferent between the career choices and some of them become workers and some entrepreneurs. The third and last case arises if the share of intelligent people is so small that q < m e , as depicted in figure 5 . In this case, some individuals with a low level of intelligence will also be entrepreneurs. The wage is P CoW,Low , so that CoW,Low are indifferent between the two careers and some of them become workers and some entrepreneurs.
Our conclusions for the case when σ > ρ α 1−α can now be summarized as follows: 
Proof in appendix A.
The intuition behind our result is straightforward. When σ ρ is large, it is difficult to be an entrepreneur and the inherited information depreciates fast, so that intelligent individuals have the upper hand. All intelligent, but no others, will become entrepreneurs unless
• there are so many intelligent individuals that if they were all entrepreneurs, the wage paid to workers would be so high that the CoW,High would be unwilling to become entrepreneurs, or if
• there are so few intelligent individuals that if they were the only entrepreneurs, there would be so many workers that the equilibrium wage would be so low that the CoE,Low would prefer to be entrepreneurs.
Let us analyze the stability of the steady states. Start with the first case, depicted in figure 3 . It is clear that the equilibrium value of m t is the steady state, whatever the value of m t−1 . This steady state is thus not only stable, it is achieved immediately, regardless of the initial share of entrepreneurs. Then, proceed with the second case when q > m w . In figure 4 , we see that any value of m t−1 such that m w > m t−1 q results in an equilibrium value of m t equal to m w , which is the steady state. Last, when m e > q, figure 5 shows that any m t−1 such that q + m t−1 (1 − q) > m e results in an equilibrium value of m t equal to m e , which is the steady state. The conclusion is thus:
Result 4 If σ ≤ ρ α 1−α , any value of m t−1 in a neighborhood of the steady state value of m, produces an equilibrium value of m t that is the steady state.
The allocation of intelligence
In the previous subsection, we established that there is a corresponding set of steady state
Consider first values of σ < ρ α 1−α . In this range of σ, intelligence is irrelevant for social sorting. As we know, m e here exceeds m w . In this range for σ, all values of m such that m e ≥ m ≥ m w constitute an equilibrium, which is represented by the shadowed area between the two curves in the bottom left panel. To depict the allocation of intelligence, we normalize the level of intelligence to be either unity or zero. The resulting mass of intelligence among entrepreneurs, denoted IQ, and the average intelligence among entrepreneurs, denoted IQ, are depicted in the two panels to the right. Since intelligence is irrelevant for sorting, IQ = mq and IQ are equal to q, i.e., the average intelligence of the population.
When σ > ρ α 1−α , m e < m w and the equilibrium value of m is unique, as shown in proposition 3. As σ increases from the point where m w and m e cross, there is a jump in social mobility. All intelligent individuals are entrepreneurs and if q < m w , so are a share of the CoE,Low. IQ thus jumps from qm e to q. The number of entrepreneurs is given by m e since the CoE,Low must be indifferent between the two career choices. 19 As σ increases further, the number of CoE,Low who become entrepreneurs falls and IQ thus increases. As long as some CoE,Low choose to be entrepreneurs, the number of entrepreneurs will equal m e , which falls as σ continues to increase. The average intelligence among entrepreneurs then increases, as seen in the right bottom panel. Eventually, no CoE,Low prefer to be 18 We do the same exercise for variations in ρ in appendix B. 19 In the depicted case, q < mw at the point where mw = me. If the opposite is true, the steady state value of m is given by mw when σ > ρ • S(σ) is a non-increasing correspondence of σ, in the sense that both max {m|m ∈ S} and min {m|m ∈ S} are non-increasing and continuous functions of σ.
• Let IQ = IQ(σ) denote the correspondence between the set of values of IQ that can be sustained as a steady state equilibrium and σ. For σ < Two mechanisms create a link between the allocation of talented individuals and entrepreneurial difficulty in our model. The first mechanism is that when it becomes more difficult to be an entrepreneur, a smaller share of the population becomes entrepreneurs. Ceteris paribus, higher entrepreneurial difficulty reduces the expected pay-off to entrepreneurs for everybody. This would, in general, lead to a smaller number of individuals choosing to become entrepreneurs which, in turn, leads to a smaller stock of intelligence among entrepreneurs, but to higher average intelligence. This mechanism is responsible for the non-increasing regions of the correspondence IQ(σ).
The second mechanism comes into the picture since everybody does not begin life with the same amount of social assets. As the difficulty of being an entrepreneur increases, the relative advantage of having a father who was an entrepreneur decreases. Expressed in a more general way; if other individual characteristics than intelligence are important for entrepreneurial rewards, their relative importance will decrease as entrepreneurial difficulty increases. The intelligence of the individual then becomes more important in determining occupational choice, and both the average and the total stock of intelligence among entrepreneurs increase. If intelligence shows a relatively small degree of correlation between parents and their offspring relative to other relevant individual characteristics, intergenerational social mobility increases. This mechanism is responsible for the jumps in IQ and intergenerational social mobility that occur at σ > 
Mobility and Endogenous Growth
We have now established some relationships between the intelligence of entrepreneurs and σ, when the latter is exogenous. In this section, we endogenize growth and σ, i.e., the flow rate of new ideas and technologies. We will abstract from growth which is driven by the accumulation of physical capital of a constant quality, and instead focus on growth caused by increases in the stock of knowledge. First, we model how growth affects the difficulty of the entrepreneur's problem and then, we let the growth rate be determined by entrepreneurial intelligence.
Entrepreneurial difficulty as a function of growth
In the introduction, we argued that it is reasonable to assume that the speed at which the economic environment changes is affected by the rate of growth. Let us now define how the entrepreneurial problem changes with growth. At t, entrepreneurs must choose an action as close to x t as possible when the level of technological advancement of the firms is characterized by A t . For each level of technology, A t , there is a "best entrepreneurial decision", x(A t ). Conditional on knowing x(A t−1 ), the closer the two technologies A t and A t−1 are, the easier it is to find an action close to x(A t ). Using the notation above, i.e., σ denoting the variance of x t conditional on knowing x t−1 , we assume
where σ(.) is an increasing function. In terms of (5), this means that σ is increasing in the distance between the old and the new technologies. Furthermore, in a steady state where the size and the composition of entrepreneurs are constant and only the latest technology is adopted, the gross growth rate of the economy between t and t − 1 is given by the ratio
. Thus, the difficulty of using technology A t , conditional on knowing how to use
is an increasing function of the steady state growth rate between t and t − 1.
Growth externalities
Now turn to the growth externality produced by intelligent individuals. In Murphy et al.
[ 16] , it is assumed that the best practice in the previous period becomes the commonly used technology in the next period. The larger the (finite) number of intelligent entrepreneurs, the larger is the average growth rate. Our idea is very similar. Since we have a continuum of entrepreneurs, the mechanism must be slightly modified. Otherwise, the practice of the next period would always be the best possible, regardless of the share of intelligent entrepreneurs. We simply postulate a reduced form relationship between the number of intelligent entrepreneurs at t − 1 and the rate of growth between t and t − 1. 20 Such a reduced form relationship is also used in Galor and Moav [13] , who assume that growth is an increasing function of the share of skilled workers in the economy. Let IQ t−1 denote the number of intelligent entrepreneurs in period t − 1. We then assume that
where G is an increasing function. 21 20 We have also investigated the case when growth is a function of average intelligence among entrepreneurs. In this case, we also get multiple steady state equilibria, but the high growth steady state is unstable. This is easily understood -when growth increases with average intelligence, an increase in σ incurs a reduction in the number of entrepreneurs. This always has a non-negative effect on average intelligence -thus causing further growth and a lower number of entrepreneurs.
21 Note that we assume that a CoE,Low, who chooses to be an entrepreneur, always adopts the most recent available technology, even though she knows perfectly well how to use the "old" technology. If we allow CoE,Low to choose the old technology, they will do so if, and only if, the noise associated with the new technology is sufficiently high relative to the increase in productivity it incurs. The necessary and As we will see, the exact characteristics of G, apart from the non-negative derivative, are generically not of qualitative importance for our results. Let us, however, give a specific example of G. Assume, for instance, that technological improvements depend on the total number of entrepreneurial ideas produced in the previous period. Furthermore, suppose that an entrepreneur finds a new idea with a probability depending on her intelligence. For simplicity, assume that only intelligent entrepreneurs can contribute to the accumulation of new ideas and that the productivity increase due to a successful idea is a constant. Let the probability that an intelligent entrepreneur finds an idea be denoted p.
The increase in productivity due to a successful idea is assumed to be a pure externality.
As in Murphy et al. [16] , we create the externality by assuming that successful ideas become public information the period after they are discovered. 22 Since each individual has measure zero, we also assume that each idea has measure zero. The amount of successful ideas is then equal to the number of intelligent entrepreneurs who find an idea. 23 The function G then has the very simple form
Multiple Equilibria
The possibility of multiple equilibria is now easily seen. From (10), we have that σ t is an increasing function of
and note that g t is equal to the steady state growth rate of output. Furthermore, g t is equal to G (IQ t−1 ), as given by (11) (or (12)).
We can then write
sufficient condition for this is: σ(g) < log g 2 1−log g 2 . Thus, if we allow this choice, the model result would be slightly different unless σ(.) is a function such that this restriction is satisfied. This issue is examined in appendix E.
22 Without changing the results, we could let the entrepreneur enjoy a share of the social return to the idea as long as some externality remains. Similarly, we could let the time lag between the creation and the general adoption of an idea be smaller than a generation, by introducing an overlapping generation structure.
23 This amount is conveniently non-stochastic.
The function σ t = f (IQ t−1 ) can be inverted to IQ t−1 = f −1 (σ t ). In figure 7 , we superimpose this inverted function on the graph of the correspondence defining the mapping between σ and the steady state equilibrium values of IQ which we derived in section 2.5. We see that if f −1 (σ) crosses IQ(σ) both to the right and to the left of the cut-off point σ = αρ 1−α , we will have multiple endogenous growth steady state equilibria with different levels of growth and intergenerational social mobility. Given the shape of the correspondence, with a non-increasing initial range and a large upward jump followed by another non-increasing part, we are not obliged to impose strong additional restrictions on f −1 (σ t ) in order to insure the existence of both a high and a low growth equilibrium. There is also a set of steady state equilibria with low growth and no mobility. This set of equilibria is given by the segment of f −1 (σ t ) inside the shaded area in figure 7.
We denote this set by A. Only children with parents in entrepreneurial positions become entrepreneurs in these equilibria. The children of entrepreneurs are more able entrepreneurs than children of workers, due to the informational advantage of having parents who used to be entrepreneurs. But, the entrepreneurs are mediocre from an intellectual viewpoint. Thus, they do not innovate and hence, changes in the economy take place slowly. The information entrepreneurs can pass on to their children is of sufficiently high relative value for them to prefer to be entrepreneurs, even if their intelligence is low.
At any of the equilibria in A, there is a larger number of entrepreneurs than in the high growth equilibrium, since low growth translates into entrepreneurial tasks that are relatively easy to execute. Nevertheless, the total amount of brain power in entrepreneurial tasks is higher in the high growth equilibrium, since high growth restricts access to entrepreneurial jobs for individuals with lower intelligence.
Stability
Let us now turn to the dynamic stability of the equilibria. The set of low growth steady state equilibria is the easiest to analyze. Recall that in results 2, we showed that for small variations of m t−1 and thus of IQ t−1 around the steady state, equilibrium m t and IQ t equal their respective steady state values. This implies that the correspondences in figure   6 do not only depict the steady state equilibrium values of m and IQ for a given σ, but also the equilibrium values of m t and IQ t given σ t in a neighborhood of set A. In other words, we can use the graphs in figure 6 for analyzing out-of-steady-state dynamics in a neighborhood of A. Using these graphs and the relation IQ t−1 = f −1 (σ t ), we can depict the local dynamics around the set of low growth dynamic steady states as in figure 8 . For values of IQ t−1 larger than the maximum in the set of dynamic steady states, IQ t is equal to 1/2m w (f (IQ t−1 )) while if IQ t−1 is smaller than the minimum, IQ t = 1/2m e (f (IQ t−1 ) ).
The set of low growth steady states A is clearly stable. Furthermore, the negative slope of the curve outside the set of endogenous growth steady states, implies that if IQ t−1 is higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) equilibrium in A, IQ t will be strictly inside set A. The dynamics around the unique high endogenous growth steady state (B) is stable and degenerate if it occurs at the horizontal portion of IQ(σ). Here, the system jumps immediately to the dynamic steady state due to the fact that the marginal group of entrepreneurs is CoE,Low and a change in their number has no effect on IQ and future growth.
If the high growth steady state occurs at the downward sloping portion of IQ(σ), the marginal group of entrepreneurs is CoW,High. This group's expected utility as entrepreneurs depends on the variance of x t . Outside the steady state, this variance depends on the entire history of σ t . Nevertheless, it is straightforward to show that the standard condition on the slopes of f (IQ) and IQ(σ), i.e, that the absolute value of the product of the slopes is smaller than unity, guarantees stability of the high endogenous growth steady state. 24 The dynamics around the high growth steady state can be oscillating since a high σ 24 See the appendix.
tends to reduce IQ and σ in the next period. On the other hand, a high value of ρ reduces tendency for oscillating behavior by inducing a positive autocorrelation in the variance of
We can now summarize:
Result 6 In a low growth steady state where σ < ρ α 1−α , a small exogenous shock to σ t
• moves the economy to a new steady state in t + 1 with m t+1 < m t−1 and with lower growth if m t−1 = m e and the shock is positive,
• moves the economy to a new steady state in t + 1 with m t+1 > m t−1 and with higher growth if m t−1 = m w and the shock is negative, and
• otherwise has no effect on IQ, growth and m.
Let IQ * and σ * denote the high endogenous growth steady state values of IQ and σ,
f (IQ * ) > −1, the high growth steady state is locally stable to an exogenous shock to σ. Furthermore:
• if the high growth steady state occurs strictly inside the horizontal segment of IQ(σ), a small exogenous shock to σ around the steady state has no effect on IQ and in the period after the shock, the economy returns to the steady state, and
• if the high growth steady state occurs at the downward sloping portion of IQ(σ) and
IQ and σ oscillate around the steady state after a small shock to σ.
Proof: In the appendix.
A two economy extension
Before concluding, let us sketch how the model could be extended to account for the empirical evidence of convergence clubs discussed in the introduction. Consider a world with two parametrically identical economies, denoted by the index i = 1, 2. To focus on our main message, assume that the two countries affect each other only through technology diffusion.
More specifically, the most advanced technology used in period t, i.e., max (A 1,t , A 2,t ), becomes a "standard" technology in period t + 1 in both countries. Note that we are not assuming that x t becomes common knowledge in t + 1, which would, of course, remove the advantage that CoE,Low have over CoE,High in the low mobility equilibrium. The reason for not assuming that x becomes public knowledge although the technology becomes standard, is that the decisions faced by entrepreneurs realistically belong to a space with many more dimensions than generated by technology.
We can now rewrite (10) as
Furthermore, assume that intelligent entrepreneurs create a growth externality in the next period by improving on the "standard" technology, i.e., on max (A 1,t , A 2,t ) regardless of whether it was used in the home country or not. Formally,
Now, consider the potential situation with one country in what we previously labeled the high endogenous growth steady state and the other in one of the low endogenous growth steady states. The entire analysis in the previous sections remain valid and both countries are in stable equilibria. The country with high IQ and large mobility creates large growth externalities which benefits also the other country. The ratio of the levels of technology used in the two countries is given by
which is constant in steady state. This implies that the growth rates of the two countries in steady state are identical but their technological state of advancement and output differ -we have convergence clubs.
Conclusions
The presented model is certainly very stylized. Nevertheless, we think it describes important real world mechanisms which relate growth, social mobility and the demands on individuals in different social positions. Intelligent individuals produce externalities by creating ideas and finding new ways of achieving things. The extent to which society can take advantage of this depends on the efficiency of the social sorting mechanism. It seems very unlikely that the full social value of such externalities are captured by those producing them. A walrasian labor market will thus assign jobs in an inefficient manner.
In a stagnant economy, individuals who are not intelligent but happen to be born in an entrepreneurial household, will enjoy a great advantage in the competition for the best (entrepreneurial) jobs. In such circumstances, the labor market will be particularly inefficient in assigning roles. According to the market, the best entrepreneurs are those maximizing today's production, without taking their contribution to future growth into account. The number of individuals whose ability to contribute to growth is small but nevertheless fill positions where the growth externality could have been produced, is higher in a low than in a high growth economy. Thus, the effects interact; lack of social mobility causing low growth, and low growth causing lack of social mobility.
The inefficiencies of the labor market are mitigated when the growth rate is higher, since large growth rates reduce the importance of the transmission of social advantages, thus making individuals compete at face value and basing their merits more on their intellectual ability. Growth is produced by intellectual ability, so the winners on the job market are those producing growth. As before, both effects interact, social mobility causing growth, and growth causing mobility. There are certainly other ways of producing growth miracles. We have abstracted from issues dealing with human capital accumulation and imperfect financial markets, which is emphasized in most of the previous literature on the topic. Such factors certainly play important roles in determining the level of social mobility enjoyed by society, and they seem likely to enforce the mechanisms discussed in this paper.
A Steady State for large values of σ
, it is clear that in steady state zt must be such that:
PCoE,Low ≤ zt ≤ P CoW,High
• If mw(σ) ≥ q ≥ me(σ), it is clear that there is a unique steady state equilibrium at m = q and z = SD −1 (q).
• If q > mw(σ), curves SD and M cross at a value of m lower than q. Consequently, if there is a steady state equilibrium, it must be at a wage such that the CoW,High are indifferent between career choices: z = P CoW,High . mw(σ) is the only number of entrepreneurs that produce this wage as a labor market equilibrium. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state equilibrium is then that a γ ∈ [0, 1] exists such that:
Clearly,
and
Thus, a steady state equilibrium exists and it is unique.
• If me(σ) > q, curves SD and M cross at a value of m larger than q. Consequently, if there is a steady state equilibrium, it must at a wage such that the CoE,Low are indifferent between career choices: z = PCoE,Low. me(σ) is the only number of entrepreneurs that produce this wage as a labor market equilibrium. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of steady state equilibrium is then that a δ ∈ [0, 1] exists such that:
B Entrepreneurial intelligence as a function of ρ
Consider an exercise similar to the one in section 2.5. Here ρ is varied between zero and unity. A higher ρ implies that the entrepreneurial task becomes easier for the CoE (because they then have better inherited information), but not for the CoW. Thus, at high levels of ρ, the social sorting mechanism should assign more weight to social than to innate assets, i.e., social background is more important than intelligence. Note that me does not depend on ρ since only σ affects the difficulty of being a entrepreneur for CoE. On the other hand, mw is a decreasing function of ρ since the unconditional variance of x = σ 1−ρ , i.e., the difficulty of being a entrepreneur, increases in ρ for CoW.
At ρ = For values of ρ below 1−α α σ, mw > me. Then, if q is larger than me only intelligent people, but not all of them, become entrepreneurs. In order to make some CoW,High willing to become workers, m must equal mw. As ρ decreases from 1−α α σ, the number of CoW,High who become entrepreneurs increase and equals min{q, mw}.
A second case arises if q < me, such that there is a scarcity of intelligent people. In this case, some of the CoE,Low must be willing to become entrepreneurs, so in this case, m = me for all values of ρ < 1−α α σ.
C Stability
The stability of the set of low endogenous growth steady states is obvious from figure 8 . Similarly, if the high growth endogenous growth occurs at the horizontal portion of IQ(σ), where IQ * = q, the stability is obvious.
Turn to the non-trivial case when IQ(σ * ) = mw(σ * ). Consider a small perturbation of σt (or, equivalently, IQt−1), given that the system has settled down at B with var(xt−1) = σ * /(1 − ρ). Let us define
and f ≡ f (IQ * ). Now note that the marginal group of entrepreneurs CoW,High, has a precision that is determined by the variance of xt rather than by σt only. Thus, P CoW,High = var(xt) −1 + α −1 , which is different from 1−ρ σt + α −1 out of steady state. As long as the marginal group of entrepreneurs is CoW,High, we then have IQt = SD var(xt)
, where the factor (1 − ρ) is due to the fact that mw(.) is defined in terms of σ rather than the steady state variance of x. This means that in a neighborhood of the steady state
Furthermore, the variance of x follows var(xt) = ρvar(xt−1) + σt. We can now find the (approximate) evolution of IQ and σ from the following recursion:
Rewriting and simplifying we have
By induction we find that IQ follows a first order difference equation with root f m w (1 − ρ) + ρ after the initial shock. This is a convex combination of unity and f m w and is thus within the unit circle if f m w is within the unit circle. Furthermore, it is negative, producing oscillations, iff f m w < − ρ 1−ρ . The first term, f m w (1 − ρ), is always negative, tending to produce oscillations, while the second, ρ, tends to produce positive autocorrelation in the variance of x and thus of IQ. QED.
D An alternative model
Here we describe a model closely resembling the model in section 2. There are, however, three main differences which make it impossible to solve this model analytically. First, instead of having only two levels of intelligence, we assume that the level of intelligence, denoted q, is continuous with a distribution represented by a distribution function F (q). As above, there is an individual signal on xt with a precision given by qi.
Second, we assume that the entrepreneurial error affects output rather than profits. The profit function of a firm is thus
Let the precision in the beliefs about x by an individual with a level of intelligence qi and with a parent who had occupation j ∈ {w, e} be denoted P (i, j). Solving for the maximum of expected profits over l, we get that the labor demand in a firm run by an individual of type i, j firm is given by 
Compared to the model in the main text, labor demand by an individual firm thus depends on the level of intelligence of the particular entrepreneur.
Third, we assume risk neutrality. Then, each individual chooses to become a worker (an entrepreneur) if the wage is higher (lower) than the expected profit. The threshold level of intelligence is determined by the condition that the expected profit equals the wage, which makes the (risk-neutral) agent indifferent between the two choices. 
We can then find the two threshold intelligence levels, denotedqe andqw qe(w/A; σ) =P (w/A) − 1 σ , 
Now consider the labor market. The supply of workers is the number of entrepreneurs' children with a level of intelligence lower thanqm and the number of workers' children with a level of intelligence lower thanqw. This means that the aggregate labor supply in period t is Ls(w/A, mt−1; σ) = mt−1F (qe) + (1 − m−1)F (qw).
We also have that mt = mt−1(1 − F (qm)) + (1 − m)(1 − F (qw)).
The aggregate labor demand is given by The two equations in (27) together define a steady state value of m and a corresponding steady state level of w/A. Now let us specify some parameters in order to illustrate the behavior of the model. We have used α = 0.5, ρ = 0.5 and set F (q) = q, so that q ∈ [0, 1]. The results are depicted in figure 9 . The top left panel shows the cut-off level of intelligence such that all individuals with a level of intelligence lower than that level prefer to be workers. We see that for low enough σ, all CoE choose to become entrepreneurs and all CoW to become workers -intergenerational mobility is zero. As σ increases, innate assets become relatively more important. The cut-off levels of intelligence for the two groups thus become closer and approach the same level at around 0.55. The bottom left panel shows the number of entrepreneurs that can be sustained Figure 9 : Growth Steady States in a steady state equilibrium. For low values of σ, there is a multiplicity of equilibria for the same reason as in the model in the main text; here there is a range of wages such that neither the CoE nor the CoW want to pursue a different career than their parents. Any level of m that produces a wage within this range is a steady state equilibrium. Above the level of σ where social mobility starts to become operative, there is a single steady state equilibrium for each level of σ.
The increase in intergenerational social mobility that an increase in σ incurs, increases the average level of intelligence among entrepreneurs. This is shown in the bottom right panel of figure 9 . The total amount of intelligence among entrepreneurs has a shape very similar to the one depicted in figure 6 . For low values of σ, only IQ levels at or below 0.25 are sustainable. At the point of σ where social mobility becomes operative, IQ increases quickly, since sorting becomes more efficient. Then IQ starts falling slowly, reflecting that it becomes more difficult for everybody to be an entrepreneur, so the share of entrepreneurs falls. Here, as in the model in the main text, two mechanisms working in opposite directions create a non-monotonous relation between σ and IQ. The first is responsible for the downward slope for low and high levels of σ. The other creates an intermediate range where IQ increases rapidly, but not discontinuously, as in the model in section 2.
The correspondence between σ and IQ depicted in figure 9 is clearly very similar to the correspondence derived in section 2. We could then use the former instead of the latter in the endogenous growth model in section 3 and produce very similar results.
E Volontary adoption of the new technology
If we assume that individuals must decide not only if to become entrepreneurs, but also which technology to adopt, the problem only becomes slightly more complicated.
The new problem is straightforward for the CoW, since they have no information regarding the technology in the previous period. Both technologies have the same level of complexity and they will thus always adopt the latest available technology.
For CoE there is a non-trivial decision to make. On the one hand, they know how to use the old technology; on the other, they know that the new technology has better productive potential. CoE who adopt the new technology (At), instead of the old (At−1), expect the utility V n = 2 log At − log wt − 1 P (i) , but if they instead use the old technology, for which they have perfect precision, they obtain V o = 2 log At−1 − log wt.
Clearly, if a CoE decides to become an entrepreneur, she adopts the new technology iff
Whatever σ, the precision of intelligent agents is larger than the precision of less intelligent ones,which means that they will adopt the new technology more eagerly. All CoE will adopt it if PCoE,Low > 1 log g 2 or σ(g) < log g 2 1 − log g 2
As long as σ(.) is such that (28) holds, all entrepreneurs use the new technology. The results will then be identical to the ones presented in the main text. Amounts of intelligence allocated to entrepreneurial activities Figure 5 
L(z t )
